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Case No. 20180847-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

CALVIN PAUL STEWART,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
INTRODUCTION
The court of appeals improperly granted Stewart a new appeal under
rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, after Stewart defaulted his
original appeal. Its decision conflicts with this Court’s precedent and
improperly expands rule 4(f) beyond its clear confines.
Rule 4(f) allows a trial court to reinstate the time to appeal if a
defendant can meet the heavy burden of showing that he was denied the right
to appeal through no fault of his own. A defendant is denied his right to
appeal only if he is “prevented…from proceeding with [an] appeal.” This
Court has held that “proceeding” with an appeal means “filing a notice of
appeal, not more” and that a “defendant who actually files an appeal…has

not been prevented from proceeding with an appeal.” Thus, the remedy
described in rule 4(f) is intentionally narrow and available only to those
defendants who did not appeal because something beyond their control
prevented them from doing so.
Stewart filed a timely pro se notice of appeal following his 2003
conviction and sentence. He later defaulted the appeal by failing to file his
brief. Based on this Court’s precedent, he clearly was not denied his right to
appeal.
Nevertheless, over a decade after Stewart defaulted his appeal, he filed
a rule 4(f) motion, arguing that he was deprived of his right to appeal because
he was not told that he could have had counsel on appeal. At an evidentiary
hearing, because transcripts of the sentencing were not available, Stewart
offered only his own self-serving testimony twelve years after the fact to
support his claim. But Stewart’s memory was considerably incomplete.
Although the trial court did not expressly find his testimony unreliable, the
court described it as a “mere claim” that did not meet the preponderance of
the evidence standard required by rule 4(f) and denied the motion.
The court of appeals reversed. Its opinion erroneously broadens rule
4(f) relief beyond the clear confines this Court has established, both through
its rule making power and in its precedent.
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The court of appeals held that a defendant who files an appeal is still
deprived of his right to appeal if he is not informed that he had the right to
counsel on appeal. That holding contradicts this Court’s clear precedent. It
also impermissibly expands the narrow purpose of rule 4(f) by allowing a
criminal defendant to challenge the quality of his appeal, rather than take
those challenges to post-conviction review—an error that this Court has had
to correct before.
The court of appeals also erred when it reversed the trial court’s ruling
that Stewart failed to prove that he had not been advised of his right to
counsel. To get there, the court improperly reassessed the evidence in a way
that conflicted with the trial court’s outcome, holding that because the trial
court made no findings as to Stewart’s credibility his testimony had to be
accepted as true.
Longstanding Utah law foreclosed that course. When presented with
an inadequate factual finding, an appellate court has only two options: it may
assume that specific findings would have been consistent with the trial
court’s decision and affirm; or it may remand for additional findings if such
an assumption would be unreasonable. The law does not allow the court of
appeals to make its own factual findings and reverse the outcome, as the
court did here.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari review on the following questions:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Rule 4(f) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits reinstatement of an appeal,
based on a convicted defendant’s claim that he was not informed of his right
to counsel on appeal, after the defendant filed a timely pro se appeal.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court’s
determination that Stewart failed to meet his burden of demonstrating he was
not informed of his right to counsel on appeal.
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews a decision of the
court of appeals for correctness. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶10, 122 P.3d
628.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of relevant facts.
Stewart Filed a Timely Notice of Appeal
When Stewart was first charged with securities fraud in August 2001,
he retained private counsel. R1–14, 18. Later, when Stewart could no longer
afford his attorney, the trial court appointed counsel. R111–12, 134–36.
However, Stewart soon became dissatisfied with his public defender and
chose to represent himself after he was “fully advised of his right to have
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counsel.” R210–12. Upon electing to proceed pro se, the trial court informed
Stewart that he could change his mind and have counsel appointed up until
about eight weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin. R212.
Stewart did not change his mind and represented himself at trial,
where he was convicted on seventeen counts of securities fraud and related
crimes. R568–70, 625–27. He also represented himself at sentencing. R678–83.1
Stewart filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and a docketing statement.
R689–90; see R1120–21. When he did not file a timely appellate brief, his
appeal was involuntarily dismissed with the caveat that he could resurrect
his appeal with the filing of a brief within ten days. R719. Despite this
additional opportunity, Stewart still failed to file a brief. See R1121–22.
Over the next few years, Stewart filed several motions and requests
with the trial court, including two motions for appointment of counsel. R737–
38, 762–67, 771, 774–75, 780–81. The trial court determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case following sentencing and dismissed
Stewart’s motions. R801, 804–06. Stewart appealed and the court of appeals
affirmed in a memorandum decision. R808, 818–19. Stewart sought certiorari
review, which was denied. R827.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing is not part of the record and
the recording is no longer available.
1
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Stewart also filed “several” petitions for post-conviction relief related
to this case, although the record is silent as to the substance or result of those
petitions. See R729–30, 936.
B.

Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court.
Stewart’s Motion to Reinstate His Appeal
Over a decade after he defaulted his first appeal, Stewart moved to

restart the time to file a first appeal under rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. R874–81, 920–31. Stewart argued that he was deprived of his right
to appeal because the trial court did not inform him at sentencing that he had
a right to counsel on appeal. R920–31. Because transcripts and recordings of
the August 2003 sentencing were no longer available, Stewart claimed that he
would rely on witness testimony to support his claim. R924.
Twelve and a half years after sentencing, the trial court held an
evidentiary hearing. R1105–26 (Addendum D). Stewart was the only witness.
He testified that he did not remember what the trial court told him when he
elected to represent himself: “To be straightforward, honest, I really can’t
remember a whole lot of exactly what he asked me.” R1119. He claimed,
nevertheless, that the court, at that time, did not inform him of his right to
counsel on appeal. R1119. He also testified that the court at sentencing did
not inform him of his right to counsel on appeal. R1120.
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On cross-examination, Stewart admitted that his memory about what
the court told him over twelve years earlier was incomplete: “There’s some
things I remember, some things I don’t.” R1123. He claimed that there were
“certain things” he wanted to remember, which he wrote “in a notebook
when [he] got back in prison so that [he] could remember them.” R1123.
Stewart did not produce the purported notes, nor did he elaborate on what
the “certain things” were, or if they had anything to do with his appeal or his
right to counsel. See R1123. And he again admitted that he did not have a “full
memory of everything that was said,” just “that which was written down.”
R1123. All he could say was that nothing in his notebook indicated that the
trial court informed him of his right to counsel on appeal. R1125.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Stewart’s right to appeal
was not denied “for several reasons.” R1145–57 (Addendum C).
First, it ruled that Stewart waived his right to counsel on appeal by
requesting to represent himself at trial and sentencing and choosing to
proceed in his appeal pro se: “He repeatedly was notified of his right to
counsel, and he repeatedly declined to be represented by counsel.” R1154–55.
Second, the trial court ruled that Stewart was at fault for his failure to
file a brief and perfect his appeal. R1155.
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Finally, the trial court ruled that even if the right to appeal includes
notification of the right to counsel on appeal, Stewart could not show that he
was not so notified. R1154–57. The court reasoned that Stewart failed to meet
his burden because he could provide nothing to support his “mere claim”
many years later that he was not informed of his right to counsel on appeal.
R1156. The trial court concluded that Stewart “clearly failed to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he has been deprived, through no fault
of his own, of his right to appeal.” R1157.
Stewart timely appealed the trial court’s ruling. R1159.
The Court of Appeals’ Decision
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court erroneously denied
Stewart’s rule 4(f) motion to reinstate the time to appeal. See State v. Stewart,
2018 UT App 151, --- P.3d --- (Addendum A).
First, it held that “a defendant is entitled to be informed of his right to
counsel on appeal,” and that “[i]f an indigent defendant is not made aware
of the right to counsel, he ‘has been prevented in some meaningful way from
proceeding with a first appeal of right.’” Id. ¶¶13–14 (quoting Manning v.
State, 2005 UT 61, ¶26, 122 P.3d 628).
The court rejected in a single footnote the State’s argument, based on
this Court’s precedent, that “Stewart was not deprived of his right to appeal,
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because he filed a notice of appeal.” Id. ¶10 n.1. The court reasoned that the
precedent was “inapplicable” because it “did not contemplate a situation in
which a defendant was denied the right to appeal by being denied the right
to counsel.” Id.
Having concluded that the “failure to inform a defendant of the right
to counsel on appeal” deprives him of the right to appeal, the court next held
that the district court clearly erred by concluding that Stewart was not so
informed. Id. ¶¶15–23. While admitting that Stewart’s “testimony was selfserving and not detailed,” the court credited his testimony despite
acknowledging that the trial court characterized it as a “mere claim” that did
not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. ¶¶21–22.
The court concluded that because the State did not present its own
evidence to rebut Stewart’s claim and because the trial court “did not make
findings that Stewart’s testimony was incredible or unreliable,” Stewart’s
testimony must be given some weight, which, the court of appeals concluded,
meets the preponderance standard. Id. It thus held that the trial court “clearly
erred” in ruling Stewart “was not informed of the right to counsel on appeal.”
Id. ¶22. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to
reinstate the period for Stewart to file a direct appeal. Id. ¶24.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, has a single, narrow

purpose—to reinstate the period to file an appeal for those defendants who
were prevented from filing a notice of appeal during the original thirty-day
period. The court of appeals, however, erroneously held that a defendant
who filed a timely notice of appeal may have the period to file another notice
of appeal reinstated under rule 4(f) if he is not told that he could have had
counsel on his first appeal.
The court of appeals’ decision contradicts this Court’s clear holdings
that a defendant is not denied the right to appeal, and therefore is ineligible
for reinstatement relief, if he does nothing more than file a timely notice of
appeal. This remains true even if a defendant is not told of his right to counsel
on appeal and subsequently defaults his pro se appeal, because rule 4(f) is not
intended to address the quality of an appeal. Such challenges are consigned
to post-conviction review.
Moreover, the court of appeals’ decision relied on an erroneous view
of what it means to “properly advise” a defendant of the right to appeal. At
the time of Stewart’s sentencing, rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, required a trial court to inform a defendant that he had the right
to appeal and that he must do so within thirty days by filing a notice of
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appeal. But it did not require a trial court to also inform a defendant that he
could have counsel on appeal. And no other authority did either. Thus, even
if the trial court did not tell Stewart that he could have had counsel on appeal,
that omission does not mean that Stewart was not “properly advised” of his
right to appeal.
II. The trial court ruled that even if Stewart were entitled to have the
period to appeal reinstated by proving that he was not informed of his right
to counsel on appeal, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. It was implicit
in the trial court’s ruling that the court did not credit Stewart’s self-serving
testimony, which was replete with memory deficiencies, of what occurred at
his sentencing hearing twelve years earlier.
The court of appeals, however, disregarded that implicit finding and
determined that the trial court made no finding at all about Stewart’s
credibility. It then continued to make its own finding that because the State
offered no evidence to contradict Stewart’s “self-serving and not detailed”
testimony, the testimony had to be credited as true. The court of appeals erred
because it is not authorized to make factual findings. Instead, when an
appellate court determines that a trial court failed to make adequate factual
findings it has only two options: affirm by assuming the trial court would
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have made findings consistent with its decision; or remand for explicit
findings.
The court of appeals should have affirmed because the record supports
the inference that the trial court did not credit Stewart’s testimony. At a
minimum, the court of appeals should have remanded so the trial court could
enter findings on the record as to Stewart’s credibility. But it erred when it
did neither, choosing instead to make its own findings and to reverse.

ARGUMENT
I.
RULE 4(f), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE,
DOES NOT PERMIT REINSTATING THE PERIOD TO
APPEAL FOR A DEFENDANT WHO ALREADY APPEALED
AND WHO ONLY CHALLENGES THE DENIAL OF HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON THE APPEAL THAT HE
ALREADY FILED AND LOST
Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, permits reinstating the
thirty-day period to appeal only if a defendant can prove that he was
prevented from filing a timely notice of appeal. See State v. Collins, 2014 UT
61, ¶¶31, 42, 342 P.3d 789; State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–18, 125 P.3d 874.
Departing from this Court’s clear precedent, the court of appeals held that
rule 4(f) authorizes reinstating the period to appeal to a defendant who
already timely appealed if he could prove that he was not told that he could
have had counsel on appeal. State v. Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶¶11–14 &
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n.1, —P.3d—. The court of appeals’ decision should be reversed for two
reasons.
First, the sole purpose of rule 4(f) is restore the right to appeal to a
defendant who was “deprived” of that right because he was “prevented”
from filing a timely notice of appeal. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶31 (cleaned up);
Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–18. The court of appeals’ decision erroneously extends
reinstatement relief to defendants who already appealed.
Second, rule 4(f) provides no remedy to a defendant who is unsatisfied
with the quality of his appeal, even if the quality of the appeal is affected by
the lack of counsel. See Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶19–20. The court of appeals’
concern with whether Stewart was informed of his right to counsel to
prosecute his timely filed appeal is irrelevant to whether he was prevented
from timely filing the appeal in the first place.
The court of appeals’ decision stands in opposition to this Court’s
precedent and the plain language and purpose of rule 4(f) by reinstating
Stewart’s right to appeal when that right was clearly not violated. This Court
should reverse.
A. Reinstating the Period to Appeal Is Not Available to a
Defendant Who Filed a Timely Pro Se Appeal
Rule 4(f) codifies the reinstatement remedy this Court first established
in Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628. See Utah R. App. P. 4(f) & adv.
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comm. note. The Court in Manning supplanted the so-called Johnson remedy,
which had been created to restore the right to appeal in “situations in which
a defendant was prevented from bringing a timely appeal through no fault of
his own.” Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶12 (emphasis added); see State v. Johnson,
635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). Because “the evolution of statutory law and
procedural rules” made the Johnson remedy “no longer feasible,” the Manning
Court created a new “readily accessible and procedurally simple method” to
restore a denied right to appeal. Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶¶14, 25–26; see id.
¶¶15–25 (describing evolution of the law and procedures). But the purpose
remained the same. Id. ¶26. Thus, for almost forty years, there has been but
one objective to the reinstatement remedy—to provide “relief for defendants
who have not filed a direct appeal because their right to appeal has been
unconstitutionally denied.” Id. ¶24 (emphasis added).
The Manning Court made clear that reinstatement is only available to
defendants who did not file a timely notice of appeal. See id. ¶¶12, 24.
“[C]riminal defendants who fail to file a notice of appeal within the required
time period are presumed to have knowingly and voluntarily waived” the
right to appeal and have exhausted their appellate remedies. Id. ¶¶1, 24
(emphasis added). But the new reinstatement procedure gives a defendant
the opportunity to prove that his failure to file an appeal was not a waiver,
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but “that he ha[d] been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his
own, of his right to appeal.” Id. ¶31; see id. ¶¶1, 32; see also State v. Kabor, 2013
UT App 12, ¶14, 295 P.3d 193 (“the reinstatement inquiry focuses…on
whether the defendant’s failure to file an appeal was a voluntary and
knowing choice”).
Thus, to be eligible for the reinstatement remedy, a defendant must
have “failed to appeal within the required thirty-day time period.” Manning,
2005 UT 61, ¶32. Only then can a defendant invoke rule 4(f) and attempt to
prove that something beyond his control prevented him from timely
appealing. Id. ¶¶31–32.2
Since Manning, this Court has reemphasized that a defendant who files
a timely notice of appeal has not been denied the right to appeal, making rule
4(f) inapplicable. In State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–19, 125 P.3d 874, decided
only two months after Manning, the Court held that the reinstatement remedy

The prerequisite of a defendant failing to appeal before reinstatement
even becomes an option was central to the Manning decision. The Court
referred to Manning’s or a hypothetical defendant’s failure to appeal at least
fourteen times throughout the opinion. See Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶¶1, 7, 8,
24, 31, 32, 33, 38, 42. But it never even suggested that a defendant who did
appeal could seek reinstatement. Indeed, such a suggestion would have
contradicted the central framework of requiring a defendant to prove that his
failure to appeal was not a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to
appeal.
2
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is not available to a defendant who filed a timely notice of appeal. The Court
explained that a denial of the right to appeal discussed in Manning occurs
when a defendant was “‘prevented’” from “’proceeding’” with an appeal. Id.
¶17 (quoting Manning, 2005 UT 69, ¶24). It then explained what “proceeding”
with

an

appeal

means:

“the

act

of

‘proceeding’

with

an

appeal…encompass[es] filing a notice of appeal, not more.” Id. ¶18.
Therefore, a defendant is only denied his right to appeal when he is
“prevented” from filing a timely notice of appeal.
More recently, this Court reaffirmed that a defendant who appealed
was not deprived of the right to appeal. First, the Court held that claims for
reinstatement are subject to harmless error review to “ensure[] that
reinstatement relief is given only to those defendants who fail to appeal
through no fault of their own.” Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶40 (cleaned up)
(emphasis added). Thus, rule 4(f) requires a defendant to prove that
“something outside of his control cause[d] the failure to appeal” and that but
for that interference, he would have appealed. Id. ¶¶31–33, 43 (emphasis
added). Finally, the Court continued by stating plainly that “[a] defendant
who actually files an appeal…has not been prevented from proceeding with
an appeal and suffers no harm.” Id. ¶42.
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In sum, throughout its history, this Court has consistently limited the
remedy of restarting the time to file a direct appeal to defendants who were
prevented from filing a notice of appeal within the original thirty-day period.
Nothing more. It is not intended to allow a defendant who timely appealed
to have a second direct appeal after the first one was unsuccessful.
Under this clear and unbroken precedent, Stewart, who filed a timely
notice of appeal, was not denied his right to appeal and has no claim under
rule 4(f). The court of appeals erred when it held otherwise. That decision is
fundamentally at odds with the purpose of rule 4(f) and this Court’s
precedent. It should be reversed.
B.

The Court of Appeals’ Concern With the Alleged Denial of
Stewart’s Right to Counsel on Appeal Does Not Fall Within
the Ambit of Rule 4(f)
The court of appeals dismissed this Court’s precedent in a footnote.

Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶10 n.1. The court essentially ignored Collins, with
its definitive statement that “[a] defendant who actually files an appeal…has
not been prevented from proceeding with an appeal and suffers no harm,”
Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶42, relegating the entire case to a single citation without
explanation. And it claimed that Rees was “inapplicable” because it “did not
contemplate a situation in which a defendant was denied the right to appeal
by being denied the right to counsel.” Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶10 n.1.

-17-

The court of appeals’ focus on Stewart’s right to counsel misses the
point. Because Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal, he was not denied his
right to appeal. Whether that timely appeal unfolded in a way that conflicted
with Stewart’s constitutional rights is a matter for post-conviction review; it
does not merit a second direct appeal.
1. Reinstating the period to file a second direct appeal is not
the proper remedy for a defendant who already filed a
direct appeal pro se, even if he was not told he could have
had counsel on his first appeal
As explained, the purpose of the reinstatement remedy is to give
someone the opportunity to appeal who lost it through no fault of his own. It
is not to give a second appeal to someone who exercised the right to appeal
merely because the first would have been more meaningful with counsel.
Rees made this clear when it held that the right to appeal is not denied
even if the appeal itself is not meaningful. After Rees’ appellate counsel failed
to prepare an adequate record, resulting in the affirmance of his conviction
on that basis, Rees sought to reinstate his appeal, claiming that he was denied
his right to appeal because his counsel was ineffective. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶2–
5. The court of appeals held that the trial court should have reinstated the
time to appeal because Rees’ right to a “meaningful appeal” was denied. Id.
¶¶5–6, 19.
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This Court reversed, holding that Rees was not deprived of his right to
appeal because he appealed. Id. ¶20. Relying on Manning, this Court
determined that ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal “does not”
“constitute a denial of the right to appeal.” Id. ¶15. So long as a defendant
“gain[s] entry to appellate courts,” by “filing of a notice of appeal, not more,”
the right to appeal has been preserved, even if the appeal is concluded “by a
ruling on the merits or involuntary dismissal.” Id. ¶18. Once that appeal is
over, a defendant must pursue post-conviction relief. Id. ¶¶18, 20.
The Rees Court rejected the court of appeals’ characterization that
reinstatement was appropriate when a defendant was denied “a meaningful
appeal.” Id. ¶19. Although the Manning Court used the term meaningful, it
was used to describe “the type of conduct or circumstance that deprived a
defendant of access to the appellate process,” not the appeal itself. Id. The
court of appeals’ use incorrectly suggested that reinstatement relief was
“available to provide an additional direct appeal to a defendant whose appeal
has resulted in an unfavorable outcome.” Id. But a defendant is not entitled
to a second appeal by claiming his first one was not “meaningful.” Id. Rather,
as explained, he must show that he was wholly prevented from filing an
appeal. Id. ¶¶17–18.
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The court of appeals has repeated the error it made in Rees—it
incorrectly focused on whether Stewart’s appeal was meaningful because he
did not have counsel to prepare a brief, Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶¶11–14,
18, rather than on the real issue rule 4(f) is designed to address—whether
Stewart was “prevented” from filing an appeal in the first place, Rees, 2005
UT 69, ¶¶17–19.
The court of appeals held that “[i]f an indigent defendant is not made
aware of the right to counsel, he ‘has been prevented in some meaningful way
from proceeding with a first appeal of right.’” Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶13
(quoting Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶26). But as explained, a defendant is only
“prevented from proceeding with an appeal” if he is prevented from filing a
timely notice of appeal. Rees, 2005 UT 69, ¶¶17–18. And even if Stewart was
not made aware of his right to counsel, that did not prevent him from
“proceeding with an appeal”—he filed one. R689–90.
The court of appeals, nevertheless, believed that Stewart was denied
his right to appeal because he lacked counsel to help him file a brief. See
Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶18. But whether a defendant files an appellate
brief, with or without counsel, is irrelevant to the only material question
under rule 4(f)—whether his right to appeal was wholly denied. The Rees
Court did not say that the act of “proceeding with an appeal” encompasses
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filing a notice of appeal, filing a brief, obtaining a decision on the merits, and
doing all of it with the assistance of counsel. It said, “the act of ‘proceeding’
with an appeal…encompass[es] filing a notice of appeal, not more.” Rees, 2005
UT 69, ¶18 (emphasis added). And that once a defendant files a notice of
appeal and “gain[s] entry to appellate courts,” as Stewart did here, he has
exhausted his right to appeal, even if the appeal is dismissed involuntarily,
as Stewart’s was. Id.
Certainly, an appeal litigated with the assistance of counsel to prepare
a brief would have been better. But rule 4(f) is not intended to assure a better
appeal. It is designed only to remedy the complete denial of an appeal.
Because Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal, it is inconsequential for
purposes of reinstatement that his appeal would have been more meaningful
had he been aided by counsel. Rule 4(f), therefore, is not applicable in
Stewart’s situation. Such defendants have “exhausted their remedy of direct
appeal” and may not seek “an additional direct appeal,” as Stewart has done,
and which the court of appeals has erroneously granted. Id. ¶¶18–19.
Defendants in Stewart’s position, however, are not left without a
remedy. Those defendants who exhausted their right to appeal but whose
appeals were defaulted in a way that violated a constitutional may seek
appropriate relief through the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See id. ¶18; see
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also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1)(a) (West Supp. 2017) (PCRA “establishes
the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a
direct appeal”). But a defendant may not circumvent the exclusive remedy
and one-year statute of limitations of the PCRA by disguising his claim as one
of a denial of the right to appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1)9a) & 107;
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a).
The court of appeals’ decision attempts an expansive redefinition of
what constitutes an “appeal” in a way that allows for multiple direct appeals
until a defendant gets one that is “meaningful.” This Court rejected that
expansion once and should reject it again.
2. Failing to inform a defendant of the right to counsel on
appeal cannot without more deprive a defendant of the
right to appeal
The court of appeals held that Stewart was denied his right to appeal
because it believed that Stewart was not “properly advise[d]” of the right to
appeal when he was not informed of the right to counsel on appeal. Stewart,
2018 UT App 151, ¶¶14, 18, 24. Even if the court had been correct that
properly advising a defendant of his right to appeal requires telling him that
he may have counsel on appeal, the error was harmless because Stewart
appealed. But the court of appeals was not correct.
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This Court has made clear that the failure to “properly advise” a
defendant of the right to appeal is harmless and cannot be a denial of the right
to appeal if the defendant appeals despite the court’s failure. Collins, 2014 UT
61, ¶42. Thus, if failing to advise a defendant of the right to counsel warrants
any consideration at all within the context of rule 4(f), it is only to determine
whether that failure prevented a defendant from filing an appeal. See id.;
Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶26. And when it does not, it is of no consequence for
purposes of rule 4(f).
In any event, not advising a defendant of his right to counsel on appeal
is not a failure to “properly” advise him of his right to appeal. In Manning,
this Court established three ways that a defendant could be denied the right
to appeal, one of which was if “the court or the defendant’s attorney failed to
properly advise defendant of the right to appeal.” Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶31.
The Court in Collins assumed that being “properly” advised of the right to
appeal means only that the defendant was informed that (1) he has a right to
appeal, and (2) that he must do so within thirty-days of sentencing, as
required by rule 22(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. ¶26; see
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)(1) (2017) (“Following imposition of sentence, the court
shall advise the defendant of defendant’s right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed.”).
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Likewise, at the time of Stewart’s sentencing, rule 22(c) required a court
to provide defendants with only the same two pieces of information. Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(c) (2003). The State is unaware of any other law, rule, case, or
procedure that existed at the time of Stewart’s sentencing that required a trial
court to tell a defendant that he could have counsel on appeal, let alone that
stated that failing to do so constituted a denial of the right to appeal and
therefore warranted reinstatement of the time to appeal. Particularly here,
where Stewart had previously waived his right to counsel and elected to
proceed pro se at trial and at sentencing, and then continued pro se on his
appeal. See R210–12. A court need not continually readvise a defendant of his
right to counsel once that right has been waived. See State v. Tharp, 395
N.W.2d 762, 764 (Neb. 1986) (“once a defendant has been informed of his
right to counsel, there is no requirement that the same information be
conveyed to a defendant on each subsequent court appearance”).
It was not until May 1, 2018—almost fifteen years after Stewart’s
sentencing—that rule 22(c)(1) was amended to require a court to inform
defendants at sentencing of “the right to retain counsel or have counsel
appointed by the court if indigent.” Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)(1) (2018); see
Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶14 n.4.
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Accordingly, the failure to advise a defendant at sentencing of the right
to counsel on appeal, at least prior to May 1, 2018, does not mean that the
defendant was not “properly advised” of his right to appeal for purposes of
rule 4(f).3
And as explained, the concern addressed by rule 4(f) is the failure to
timely file a notice of appeal. Whether a court advises a defendant that he has
a right to counsel to prosecute a timely filed appeal does not inform whether
he was prevented from timely filing the appeal in the first place.
The court of appeals’ holding to the contrary is significantly
problematic. Up until a few months ago, nothing expressly required a trial
court to advise a defendant of his right to counsel on appeal. In addition, rule
4(f) has no time limit. As a result, under the court of appeals’ decision, any
defendant, at any time, and whether he appealed already or not, can have the
time to appeal reinstated by showing that the trial court did not tell him
something that no law required a court to say. Rule 4(f) was not intended to
provide such a wide-reaching, and practically unlimited reinstatement of the
period to appeal, especially for defendant’s who already exercised their right
to appeal, as Stewart did here. Rather, the rule was created to narrowly and

Whether the May 2018 amendment changes the analysis should not
be decided here because it was not in effect at Stewart’s sentencing.
3
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specifically remedy the complete denial of the right to appeal when
something beyond a defendant’s control prevented him from appealing. This
Court should reaffirm that principle and reverse the court of appeals’
decision.
****
Stewart was not denied his right to appeal because he filed a timely
notice of appeal. Whether Stewart was informed of his right to counsel on
appeal is irrelevant to the reinstatement inquiry because the trial court was
not required to inform him again of his right to appeal after he waived it, and
because it did not affect the timely filing of Stewart’s appeal. The court of
appeals’ decision should be reversed.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED
BASED ON ITS OWN IMPROPER FACTUAL FINDING
THAT STEWART’S TESTIMONY WAS CREDIBLE, WHEN
ITS CHOICES WERE LIMITED TO AFFIRMING OR
REMANDING FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
The court of appeals also erroneously held that Stewart had proved
that he had not been advised of his right to counsel on appeal, improperly
substituting its weighing of the evidence for the trial court’s.
The trial court concluded that Stewart did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was not told of his right to counsel on
appeal. This was so, it reasoned, because Stewart had provided no evidence
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to corroborate his “mere claim…11 years after sentencing, that he [was] quite
sure” that he was not told of his right to counsel on appeal. R1156.
The court of appeals reversed. In essence, it held that the trial court had
to (1) find that Stewart’s testimony was credible because it was
uncontradicted, and (2) conclude that Stewart’s testimony alone met his
burden of proof. Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶22.
But that holding contradicts binding precedent that precludes
appellate courts from making factual findings. Where factual findings are not
expressly made or are otherwise insufficient, appellate courts are limited to:
(1) assuming that any omitted findings would have been consistent with the
trial court’s ruling if the record could support the assumption and affirm; or
(2) remanding for more detailed findings. The court of appeals did neither,
choosing instead to essentially make its own findings on appeal. This was
error.
For over 65 years this Court has held that where “there are no findings
of fact” appellate courts are to “assume that the trier of the facts found them
in accord with its decision,” and “affirm the decision if from the evidence it
would be reasonable to find facts to support it.” Mower v. McCarthy, 245 P.2d
224, 226 (Utah 1952); accord State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788, n.6 (Utah 1991)
(citing cases). If an “ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption
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unreasonable” the appropriate remedy is a remand for further findings.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; accord State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶24, 282 P.3d 998
(“failure to state the grounds for a decision may only justify remand to the trial
court”) (quotation simplified). But an appellate court may not make its own
findings of fact to fill in the gap. “[I]t is not the function of an appellate court
to make findings of fact because it does not have the advantage of seeing and
hearing witnesses testify.” Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
Both this Court and the court of appeals have followed these two
options in recent rule 4(f) cases. In Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶56, Collins testified
at a rule 4(f) hearing that he was not told of the thirty-day deadline to file an
appeal, and that if he had been, he would have made sure his attorney filed
one. The record, however, was “unclear” whether the trial court believed his
testimony. Id. ¶57. While the court did make some credibility findings with
respect to Collins’ testimony, it “did not make a specific credibility finding
with respect to Mr. Collins’s testimony concerning the thirty-day deadline.”
Id. “Because of this ambiguity,” the Court remanded to the trial court for the
requisite factual finding. Id.
Conversely, in State v. Robles-Vasquez, 2015 UT App 108, ¶7, 349 P.3d
769, the defendant testified at his rule 4(f) hearing that he had asked his
counsel to file an appeal, but his counsel failed to so do. The trial court stated
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that the defendant’s testimony “seem[ed] disingenuous” because it took him
three years to claim a denial of the right to appeal. Id. The court of appeals
held that the trial court’s ruling, although lacking an explicit finding of
credibility, “implicitly found that [Robles-Vasquez] did not ask his counsel to
file an appeal within the permitted time,” and affirmed. Id. ¶13.4
The court of appeals here stated that “the [trial] court did not make
findings” about Stewart’s credibility. Stewart, 2018 UT App 151, ¶22. It
therefore had two options: affirm or remand for findings.
The court of appeals, however, erroneously reversed. While admitting
that Stewart’s testimony was “self-serving and not detailed,” the court
determined that because “the State offered no evidence to the contrary and
because the court did not find that the evidence presented was incredible or
unreliable,” the trial court “clearly erred” in denying the motion. Stewart,
2018 UT App 151, ¶22. This is wrong for two reasons.
First, the court of appeals’ analysis creates an intolerable paradigm—
testimony that is not directly contradicted is credible as a matter of law. A

See also Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶¶25–27 (in a non-rule 4(f) case, this Court
held that the court of appeals erred in deciding that the trial court’s “failure
to articulate the basis for [its] decision warranted reversal” because the reason
for the decision was “apparent on the record,” but even if it were not
apparent, the court of appeals erred “in reversing [the] ruling instead of
remanding”).
4
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trial fact-finder—court or jury—sees and hears the witnesses testify. Even if
uncontradicted, the fact-finder may reject the testimony for several reasons,
including the witness’s demeanor; the witness’s motive to lie; factors that
may have deteriorated the witness’s memory, such as the passage of time;
and the lack of corroboration. Thus, the trial court was under no obligation
to accept Stewart’s “self-serving and not detailed” account of what was or
was not said at a hearing twelve years earlier, even if uncontroverted by the
evidence from the State. See Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1971)
(“The trial court did not have to believe [the defendant’s] self-serving
statement”).
Second, the court of appeals’ conclusion that Stewart’s testimony was
“uncontroverted” ignores the frailties of Stewart’s testimony. While the State
did not present its own witnesses—likely because it could not find anyone
who could remember the dialogue at Stewart’s sentencing hearing so many
years earlier—Stewart’s testimony was far from certain.
Stewart candidly admitted that he did not have a “full memory” of
everything he was told. R1123. He could not “remember a whole lot” of what
was said about his right to counsel when he waived it. R1119. And he could
only remember “certain things” from his sentencing hearing because he
wrote them in a notebook. R1123. But he claimed that the trial court did not
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tell him of his right to counsel on appeal, since he purportedly did not make
a note of that fact in his notebook. R1125. But Stewart did not claim that his
notebook says he was not told about his right to counsel.
Stewart’s testimony really boils down to this: his admittedly limited
notes said nothing about the right to counsel, so it must not have been
addressed. Thus, the only thing Stewart had to support his claim was the
absence of documentation along with an admission that his documentation
was incomplete.
The trial court, having witnessed Stewart testify, and being in the best
position to assess Stewart’s demeanor and credibility, determined that this
“mere claim” failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.
R1156–57. And the foundation for the “mere claim”—Stewart’s incomplete
memory and documentation—was not so incontrovertible that the court of
appeals could properly override the trial court’s assessment of its
insufficiency to meet Stewart’s burden of proof. The court of appeals should
have affirmed because it is apparent in the record that the trial court did not
find Stewart’s self-serving testimony, with admitted memory deficiencies,
credible or persuasive enough to meet his burden of proof and that finding
was reasonable.
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Instead, the court of appeals erroneously made its own credibility
determination. That is not the court of appeals’ prerogative. The only options
the court of appeals had were to affirm based on the trial court’s implicit
finding consistent with its ruling, or to remand for more explicit findings. It
had no authority to reverse based on the absence of findings or based on its
own credibility determination. The court of appeals’ failure to adhere to this
Court’s clear precedent warrants reversal.

CONCLUSION
The court of appeals’ decision should be reversed for two reasons. First,
Stewart was not denied his right to appeal because he filed a timely notice of
appeal and because any failure to inform Stewart of the right to counsel on
appeal did not constitute a failure to properly advise him of his right to
appeal. Second, even if the failure to inform Stewart of the right to counsel on
appeal could warrant reinstatement, the court of appeals erroneously
disregarded the trial court’s conclusion that Stewart did not prove he was not
so informed. The State asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals’
decision.
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